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EQUITY IN AMERICAN AND JEWISH LAW
Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Ph.D. *
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the subject of equity in the laws of the
United States and in Jewish law. 1 The equitable principles and
remedies in the law of the United States are rooted in the common law
of England. Their origins are more fully elaborated upon below. The
equitable principles in Jewish law, as established in the Talmud,
specifically in the Mishna and Gemara, are rooted in the Torah, 2 which
Ph.D. (Law), The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. General Counsel and V.P. M.E. J.
Transboundary Development, Ltd., Israel. This article is dedicated to Rabbi Aaron HaCohen
Gold and to Bella and Ben Schepsman, as well as to the memories of Rabbi Aaron
Kirschenbaum and R. Avraham Moshe Kornfeld. I wish to thank the editors of the Touro Law
Review for their excellent editorial assistance, particularly during the COVID19
pandemic/plague.
1 See Amihai Radzyner, Between Scholar and Jurist: The Controversy Over the Research
of Jewish Law Using Comparative Methods at the Early Time of the Field, 23 J.L. & RELIG.
189 (2007); Assaf Likhovski, The Invention of “Hebrew Law” in Mandatory Palestine, 46
AM. J. COMP. L. 339 (1998); Michael Walzer, The Legal Codes of Ancient Israel, 4 Yale J.L.
& HUMAN 335 (1992) (explaining the various codes); Izahk Englard, The Problem of Jewish
L.
REV
254
(1968),
Law
in
a
Jewish
State,
3
ISR.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/
9B0B61FD5AACEC17F1BE174A387E9DEB/S0021223700001424a.pdf/
problem_of_jewish_law_in_a_jewish_state.pdf.
With the increasing tendency in Israel to replace the old Ottoman civil
law, the familiar question of the reception of Jewish (sic) (talmudic) law
has once again become the subject of lively discussion . . .The forceful
demand “to base the laws of the State on the Halacha” comes especially
from the religious parties. [Footnote omitted] But representatives of the
nonreligious parties also recommend the reception of Jewish law in those
areas of private law [Footnote omitted] where no decisions on ideological
grounds need to be made.
Id. at 254. The term “Halakha” refers to the collective body of Judaism’s religious law, i.e.,
rabbinic law, which includes the Torah, the Talmud, established rabbinic decisions, and
customary law. Michael Walzer, The Legal Codes of Ancient Israel, 4 Yale J.L. & HUMAN
335 (1992).
2 The Torah is the name that the Rabbis and Jewish people for millennia refer to as the Five
Books of Moses (Old Testament), or the Pentateuch, the Greek for five. GEORGETOWN
*
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is divided into two separate parts: The written Torah, referred to in
Hebrew as the “Torah Shebichtav” (literally translated from the
Hebrew, as the “written Torah”), and the oral Torah, or “Torah
Sheba’al Peh,” (literally translated from the Hebrew, as the “Torah in
the mouth”). 3 Jewish tradition holds that Moses received both at Mt.
Sinai and that over the course of the Israelites’ forty-year trek through
the desert, he imparted it to the people and that these were passed down
through the generations. 4
The “Torah Shebichtav,” is comprised of the Tanakh 5 or the
Pentateuch (Five Book of Moses), the twenty-one books of the
Prophets (beginning with Joshua and ending with Malachi), and the
thirteen volumes of the “Ketuvim” or other writings, which include,
the Psalms, Proverbs, Job, the Song of Songs and Chronicle I and II,
for a total of thirty-nine volumes. 6 The “Torah Sheba’al Peh,”
encompasses the rules, interpretations, and explications of the Torahic
laws, that were compiled and combined into the Mishna and Gemara,
among others, following the destruction of the Second Temple in
Jerusalem. The latter are elaborated upon infra. Suffice it to say, that
a direct comparison between the procedural, or the substantive aspects
of the common law of equity and that of Jewish law is not possible.
Nevertheless, they both have similarities, particularly given
equity’s character. This fact will become quickly apparent to the
reader, in the ensuing parts of the article. Indeed, one major reason
that a direct comparison between the two systems is not possible is
primarily due to their dissimilar internal adjudicative logic. Before

UNIVERSITY, BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE AND WORLD AFFAIRS, HALAKHA, (2020)
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/halakha.
3 The Oral Torah/Law expounds upon and explains what the laws of the Torah mean and
how one is to follow them. For example, the Torah declares in the Ten Commandments (in
Hebrew Asseret Ha’Dibrot, or the ten statements) “Remember the Sabbath day, and keep it
holy.” Exodus 20:8-11; Deuteronomy 5:12-15. The Oral Torah specifies what that means
and, for instance, defines exactly what work is, as well as the how to go about fulfilling the
Commandment. See generally Rabbi Julian Sinclair, Torah Sheba’al Peh, THE JC (Mar. 6,
2009), https://www.thejc.com/judaism/jewish-words/torah-sheba-al-peh-1.8061.
4 Oral Torah vs. Written Torah, TORAH.ORG, https://torah.org/learning/basics-primer-torahoraltorah. “Both have been with us, according to Jewish sources, for all of the past 3300 years.
And without both, it is impossible to fully understand traditional Jewish teaching or thought.
The Written Torah, (sic) mentions each of the Commandments, or Mitzvo[t], only in passing
or by allusion. The Oral Law fills in the gaps.” Id.
5 The word “Tanakh” is an abbreviation of Torah, Neviim (Prophets), and Ketuvim.
6 With regard to the volumes of the Tanakh, see generally Religion: The Tanakh, JEWISH
VIRTUAL LIBRARY (2019), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-tanakh-full-text.te.
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setting off on the exploration of equity, in both traditions, I provide a
road map to this piece.
The article opens with Part II, a discussion of the common law
of equity. Part III defines equity in the English and American courts;
includes a discussion of its origins; and includes case studies of
equitable remedies, including the injunctions and specific
performance. Part IV addresses the Mishnaic Jewish law of equity,
also providing cases or examples which include remedies. By
necessity, the Hebraic law portion will be more thorough, as the author
believes that this subject matter is less familiar to most readers.
II.

COMMON-LAW EQUITY
A.

The Origins of the Common Law

Following the Norman conquest of England in 1066, 7 they
introduced an entirely new legal system to govern the English. The
new law was noteworthy, as it fostered the subsequent growth of
English law. Indeed, the term ‘common law’ was established in the
succeeding years, in order to denote the new system of legal principles
founded by the English courts. Moreover, the Norman Kings, who
now ruled over England, also created the Courts of King’s Bench. 8
The decisions of the King’s Bench courts 9 in interpreting various rights
and obligations led to the dawning of the common law principles we

7
The assault and occupation of Britain by the armies of Norman, Breton, Flemish, and
French soldiers was led by William the Conqueror, the Duke of Normandy. “The conquest
saw the Norman elite replace that of the Anglo-Saxon and take over the country’s lands, [etc.]”
Mark Cartwright, The Impact of the Norman Conquest of England, ANCIENT HISTORY
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.ancient.eu/article/1323/the-impact-of-thenorman-conquest-of-england.
8 Development of Equity in England, LEXUNIVERSE, GLOBAL LEGAL INFORMATION (2008),
http://www.lexuniverse.com/trust-equity/uk/Development-of-Equity-in-England.html.
9 Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court still maintains a King’s Bench jurisdiction. The Court
has the power to consider any case pending in a lower court and even some matters not pending
in the courts when it sees the need to address an issue of “immediate public importance.”
When it does so, the Supreme Court exercises its “King’s Bench power” or its power of
“extraordinary jurisdiction” as provided by the Pennsylvania Constitution and Pennsylvania
law; King’s Bench Power and Power of Extraordinary Jurisdiction: Can the Supreme Court
Hear Any Case it Chooses?, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF PENNSYLVANIA COURTS, OFFICE OF
COMMUNICATIONS (last revised Oct. 2013), http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting2236/file-1741.pdf?cb=b40ffc.
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employ today. 10 Nevertheless, if a decision of a common-law court
was found to be unfair or unjust, the litigant had a right granted to her,
to petition the King or Queen directly, by means of a writ. This

10
See, e.g., Court of King’s Bench records 1200-1702, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S NATIONAL ARCHIVE,
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-guides/court-kingsbench-records-1200-1600.
What was the Court of the King’s Bench?
The King’s Bench was the most senior criminal court in England for most
of its existence, exercising supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior
criminal courts. It was based on the principle of pleas heard regularly and
formally within the king’s immediate purview even if not always in his
actual presence.
The usual mechanism for bringing cases from local inferior courts to the
King’s Bench was by means of a writ of certiorari (requiring the record to
be sent to King’s Bench for review) obtained by an unsuccessful
defendant.
There was an on-going conflict between the King’s Bench and Common
Pleas courts over their respective shares of civil litigation. This was only
settled after 1660. However, the court’s close association with the king
meant it was superior to Common Pleas, taking from it cases where error
was alleged.
The case law, or common law, was originated by both the King’s Bench and Common Pleas
in England, during the 13th and 14th centuries. See generally ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF
THE COMMON LAW (2010); THEODORE FRANK THOMAS PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW (5th ed. 1956). Note that for some 460 years (1200 – 1640), both courts issued
case law judgments on their own. These opinions would have needed to be merged.
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procedure was similar to those employed by both Moses 11 and King
Solomon.12
11
Exodus 18:13 – 23, BIBLE GATEWAY (New International Version), https://www.bible
gateway.com/passage/?search=Exodus+18&version=NIV:
13The next day Moses took his seat to serve as judge for the people, and
they stood around him from morning till evening.14 When his father-inlaw saw all that Moses was doing for the people, he said, “What is this
you are doing for the people? Why do you alone sit as judge, while all
these people stand around you from morning till evening?”
15Moses answered him, “Because the people come to me to seek God’s
will.16 Whenever they have a dispute, it is brought to me, and I decide
between the parties and inform them of God’s decrees and instructions.”
17
Moses’ father-in-law replied, “What you are doing is not good.18 You
and these people who come to you will only wear yourselves out. The
work is too heavy for you; you cannot handle it alone.19 Listen now to me
and I will give you some advice, and may God be with you. You must be
the people’s representative before God and bring their disputes to him.20
Teach them his decrees and instructions, and show them the way they are
to live and how they are to behave.21 But select capable men from all the
people—men who fear God, trustworthy men who hate dishonest gain—
and appoint them as officials over thousands, hundreds, fifties and tens.22
Have them serve as judges for the people at all times, but have them bring
every difficult case to you; the simple cases they can decide themselves.
That will make your load lighter, because they will share it with you.23 If
you do this and God so commands, you will be able to stand the strain,
and all these people will go home satisfied.” (emphasis added).
12 1 Kings 3:16-27 ; The Brilliant Wisdom of King Solomon (Baruch C. Cohen trans., 1998),
https://www.jlaw.com/Commentary/solomon.html.
Two women [prostitutes,] came to King Solomon and stood before him.
One woman (#1) said: ‘My Lord, this woman and I dwell in the same
house, and I gave birth to a child while with her in the house. On the third
day after I gave birth, she also gave birth. We live together; there is no
outsider with us in the house; only the two of us were there. The son of
this woman died during the night because she lay upon him. She arose
during the night and took my son from my side while I was asleep, and
lay him in her bosom, and her dead son she laid in my bosom. when I got
up in the morning to nurse my son, behold, he was dead! But when I
observed him (later on) in the morning, I realized that he was not my son
to whom I had given birth!’
The other woman (#2) replied: ‘It is not so! My son is the live one and
your son is the dead one!’
The first woman (#1) responded: ‘It is not so! Your son is the dead one
and my son is the living one!’
They argued before King Solomon.
King Solomon said: ‘this woman (#2) claims “‘My son is the live one and
your son is the dead one, “‘and this woman (#1) claims “‘Your son is the
dead one and my son is the living one!”‘‘
King Solomon said, ‘Bring me a sword!’ So they brought a sword before
the King. The King said, ‘Cut the living child in two, and give half to one
and half to the other’

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2020], Art. 11

114

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

Historically, a good deal of formal litigation in the English
legal system occurred or was divided between two courts: “the
common law” or “law” courts, and “the Chancery” or, “equity”
courts. 13 Although the two systems were complementary, the law and
equity courts each had their own discrete procedural system,
jurisprudence, and viewpoint. 14 Indeed, a critical difference between
a “court of law” and the “chancery courts” was that the law courts
required juries, 15 which the latter did not. Moreover, the common law
procedure, which was more formalized, was consequently scorned, so
much so that in the past, both the legal and lay communities were
inclined to discount its expansion to meet the vital needs of the day. 16
On the other hand, chiefly during the twentieth century, equity, in the
United States, was promoted in a manner that obscured the principal
shortcomings of its procedural model. 17
B.

The Juxtaposition of the Law and Equity Courts

The common law’s law courts had three distinguishing
characteristics: (1) the writ, or formulary system, (2) the jury, and (3)

The woman (#2) turned to the King, because her compassion was aroused
for her son, and said: ‘Please my Lord, give her the living child and do not
kill it!’
But the other woman (#1) said: ‘Neither mine nor yours shall he be. Cut!’
The King spoke up and said: ‘Give her (#2) the living child, and do not
kill it, for she is his mother!’ All of Israel heard the judgment that the
King had judged. They had great awe for the King, for they saw that the
wisdom of God was within him to do justice. [I Kings 3:16 – 2l7]. The
woman was rightfully awarded custody of her son.
13 Stephen N. Seubrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 UNIV. PENN. L. REV 909, 914 (1987).
14 Id.
15
On the jury system and its development see GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, A
SHORTENED HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1987). The authors of the United States Constitution
preserved this right in the 6th Amendment, which provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury. . .”; and in civil cases the 7th Amendment states: “In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury. . . .” See The Bill
of Rights: What Does it Say?, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://www.archives. gov/foundingdocs/bill-of-rights/what-does-it-say (Oct. 12, 2016). A modern example of a chancery court
is Delaware’s Court of Chancery.
See, e,g,, The Delaware Court of Chancery
https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery.
16 Seubrin, supra note 13, at 914.
17 Id.
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the single issue pleading. 18 The “law” court’s procedures, as noted
above, were inflexible and formalistic, while those in the chancellery
courts were not. Moreover, as noted above, unlike the law courts, the
chancellery courts had no jury trials – as they were not seised with the
jurisdiction to hold jury trials – cases were heard by a chancellor. Each
developed in Great Britain “between the thirteenth and sixteenth
centuries and later influenced legal development in America. Each
represented a means of confining and focusing disputes, rationalizing
and organizing law, and applying rules in an orderly, consistent, and
predictable manner.” 19
As for equity, “[s]ubjects of the king, desirous of royal aid,
would bring grievances to the Chancellor, who served as the king’s
secretary, adviser, and agent. The Chancellor’s staff, the Chancery,
sold writs, ‘royal order(s) which authorized a court to hear a case and
instructed a sheriff to secure the attendance of the defendant.’” 20
Indeed, “[o]ver time, ‘plaintiffs could not get to the court without a
chancery writ, and the formulae of the writs, mostly composed in the
thirteenth century to describe the claims then commonly accepted,
slowly became precedents which could not easily be altered or added
to.’” 21 Furthermore, these writs increasingly began to convey an idea
of what factual circumstances would allow, or yield a given outcome
or remedy. By the fourteenth century, a systematic body of substantive
equitable principles evolved from the writs. 22 Nevertheless, “[t]he
contemporary English historian, Milsom, explains that one cannot find
the precise beginning of the Equity Court, for, in a sense, it had been
there all along.
Like all English colonies, the United States adopted the
common law, also known as case law, as it was developed by judges
in England. In so doing, it embraced a system, based upon the
decisions and precedents established by those judgments.
Id. (citing S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 26-46
(1969)). “The three Central law courts were King’s Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas.”
For a description of these courts, see id. at 20-22; see also THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 139-56 (5th ed. 1956).
19 Id.
20 Id. (citing MILSOM, supra note 18, at 22).
21 Id. (citing MILSOM, supra note 18, at 25).
22 Id. (citing SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389
(1886)). (“[Indeed] so great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of the
Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the
interstices of procedure . . . .”).
18
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Consequently, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a
separate common-law system evolved and developed in the United
States. This unique body of rules of decision was anchored in
judgments or verdicts based on precedents, or stare decisis.23
However, the law courts in America, as in England, were not always
competent to adjudicate certain classes of disputes. For example, when
unusual questions come before a court, and it is unable to resolve it
employing prevailing statutes or written rules of law, judges would
have to turn to their sister equity courts for the resolution of the case.
Today, however, that is not an issue, certainly not in the federal court
system, as the law courts and equity courts were merged in 1938. 24
III.

EQUITY DEFINED

Equity is a set of legal principles in jurisdictions that follow the
English common law tradition. 25 Indeed, equity complements the law
court’s rules 26 and affords courts wide discretion in applying justice in
See generally H.C. Black, The Principle of Stare Decisis, 34 THE AM. L. REGISTER 745,
745
(1886),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4147&context=penn_law_revi
ew:
REASONS AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE.-The policy of the
courts, and the principle upon which rests the authority of judicial
decisions as precedents in subsequent litigations, is embodied in the
maxim, Stare decisis et non quieta movere-to abide by the precedents and
not to ‘disturb settled points. Its meaning is, that when a point of law has
been once solemnly and necessarily settled by the decision of a competent
court, it will no longer be considered open to examination, or to a new
ruling, by the same tribunal or those which are bound to follow its
adjudications.
Id.
24
In 1934, Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, under that authority the
United States Supreme Court, ratified uniform rules of civil procedure for the federal courts.
One of the changes that the Court made in those rules, was the elimination of the two court
system. The 1938 rules combined the rules of both, actions at law and actions in equity, into
one body: The Rules of Civil Procedure. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Merge Equity
and Common Law, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (Sept. 16, 1938), https://www.fjc.gov/history/
timeline/federal-rules-civil-procedure-merge-equity-and-common-law; THE RULES ENABLING
ACT OF 1934, ch. 651, Pub. L. No. 73–415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072).
25 “The Common Law has changed a good deal since the beginning of our series of
[Massachusetts] reports, and the search after a theory which may now be said to prevail is very
much a study of tendencies.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
26
Jurisdiction:
Equity,
FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
CENTER,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-equity.
The framers of the Constitution granted the federal courts jurisdiction over both common-law
actions and suits in equity. Equity was a centuries-old system of English jurisprudence in
23
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accordance with natural law. 27 Equitable remedies originated in
reaction to the inflexible procedures of the English “law” courts.
Frustrated plaintiffs turned to the Norman Kings when they were
unable to “procure” the outcomes that they required to continue
living. 28 Consequently, at some point between the 11th and 12th
centuries, the King established the Court of Chancery, so justice could
be done when the law courts were unable to resolve an issue. However,
the equity principles as administered in England were never intended
to create a new body of law, 29 but rather, were introduced for the
purpose of assisting and giving effect to the general laws of the realm.
In fact, an essential maxim, which is frequently stated, is that “equity
follows the law.” 30 Its Latin form is “aequitas sequitur legem.” A
similar maxim is “equity follows the law, but does not control it.”31
The purpose of equity is to support the common law and carry it into
practical effect 32
which judges-based decisions on general principles of fairness in situations where rigid
application of common-law rules would have brought about injustice. Judges exercised
equitable jurisdiction based on a distinct set of procedures.
Id.
27
See generally PAUL HELM, EQUITY, NATURAL LAW, AND COMMON GRACE Chapter 12
(2004).
28 Penny Tucker, The Early History of the Court of Chancery: A Comparative Study, 115
THE ENG. HIST. REV. 791 (2000); William Lindsay Carne, A Sketch of the History of the High
Court of Chancery from Its Origin to the Chancellorship of Wolsey, 13 VA. L. REG. 391 (1927).
29 See generally SNELL’S EQUITY (John McGhee ed., 32nd ed. 2010).
30 Hedges v Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893) (citing Magniac v. Thomson, 15 How.
283, 299 (1854), declaring “that wherever the rights or the situation of parties are clearly
defined and established by law, equity has no power to change or unsettle those rights or that
situation, but in all such instances the maxim equitas sequitur legem is strictly applicable.”).
31 See, e.g., Beall v. The Surviving Executors of John Fox, 4 Ga., 425 (1848).
The principles of equity, as administered in Great Britain, were never
intended to create a new lato, but were introduced for the purpose of
assisting and giving effect to the general laws of the realm. Equity
follows the law, but does not control it. The office of Equity is to
protect and support the Common Law, and carry it into practical effect,
to secure its protecting influence for the benefit of the subject, whereby
reason of its universality it would fail to accomplish that object.
Id.
32 Id. For example, the court held in Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. 557, 569 (1869), that:
A party does not forfeit his rights to the interposition of a court of equity
to enforce a specific performance of a contract if he seasonably and in
good faith offers to comply, and continues ready to comply, with its
stipulations on his part, although he may err in estimating the extent of his
obligation. It is only in courts of law that literal and exact performance
is required. (emphasis added).
Id.
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Thus, in the 1927 decision of Reel v. Combes, the Ohio Court
of Appeals explained equity as follows:
It is the general principles of equity, which are
based upon the equalization of burdens and benefits.
This principle is founded in the common law. This
equitable obligation to contribute is unchallenged in the
law . . . in all jurisdictions. Thus, it becomes a matter
for determination by a court of equity, and the rule
governing the courts, well established in all
jurisdictions, is that recovery by way of contribution
depends upon proportion of liability and benefit.
Contribution in law is the equalization in proportionate
sense of obligation incurred and the benefit received. 33
Other courts have also described the principles of equity. For
example, in Wells v. Pierce, 34 the court observed that equity, as a great
branch of the law of England, was brought over by the colonists and
has always existed as a part of the common law, in its broadest sense,
in New Hampshire. Likewise, in Continental Guaranty Corp. v.
People’s Bus Line, Inc., 35 the court declared
[w]e are of the opinion that the principles of
equity formed a part of the common law adopted at the
time of the Revolution.
These principles as
administered in Great Britain were never intended to
create a new law but were introduced for the purpose of
assisting and giving effect to the general laws of the
realm. Equity follows the law, but does not control
it.” 36
Similarly, in Campbell v. Colorado Coal & Iron Co., 37 the
court noted “[w]e use the term ‘common law’ in its broader sense, as
including those doctrines of equity jurisprudence which have not been
expressed in legislative enactments.” 38 Finally, the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 4(2) (2011) provides that
“[a] claimant otherwise entitled to a remedy for unjust enrichment,
Rell v. Combes, 25 Ohio App. 476, 479, 159 N.E. 133, 135 (1927).
Wells v. Pierce, 27 N.H. 503, 512 (1853).
35 Continental Guaranty Corporation v. Peoples Bus Line, 31 Del. 595, 117 A. 275, 279
(Del. Super. Ct. 1922).
36 Id. at 31 Del. 605, 117 A. 279.
37
Campbell v. Colorado Coal and Iron Co., 9 Colo. 60, 64, 159 N.E. 133, n. 33.(Colo.
1886).
38 Id. at 64, 10 P. at 250.
33
34
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including a remedy originating in equity, need not demonstrate the
inadequacy of available remedies at law.”
Accordingly, as utilized and defined herein, equity refers to a
“sense of considerations of fairness, reasonableness, and policy often
necessary for the sensible application of the more settled rule of law.”39
Indeed, equity, by its nature, requires a balancing of interests. 40
However, the question should be, is the use of equity fair and
reasonable to both parties? And, is the court or tribunal effective when
it employs equity in resolving a dispute? The answer to that question
is both yes, and no, depending on the facts of the case. Courts have,
of course, demonstrated that they can be fair, reasonable, and
sensible. 41
Nevertheless, the principles of equity are not solely confined to
the common law system. It is an essential doctrine that is routinely
utilized by international adjudicative bodies, or quasi-international
courts, e.g., the United States Supreme Court, when it adjudicates
transboundary water disputes between the several states. 42 “Indeed,
equity is the hallmark of transboundary water disputes. For example,
in adjudicating these conflicts, unless a treaty governs the allocation of
the resource, the default mechanism is the equitable doctrine of
equitable allocation.” 43
Moreover, recently introduced instruments, including the 1997
United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, also include equity and equitable

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (5th ed. 1998).
Rell, supra note 33, at 479, 159 N.E. at 133.
41 BROWNLIE, supra note 39, at 25.
42 See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (“As Kansas thus recognizes the right
of appropriating the waters of a stream for the purposes of irrigation, subject to the condition
of an equitable division between the riparian proprietors, she cannot complain if the same rule
is administered.”) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the equities between Kansas and
Colorado, see generally Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Kansas v. Colorado: State Sovereignty and the
Equitable Allocation of Water, in WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND THE LAW (Erkki J.
Hollo, ed. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3168284; see also,
Rhett B. Larson, Law in the Time of Cholera, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1271 (2017),
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol92/iss3/6. (“Yet water law focuses primarily on two
agendas. First, the ‘Blue Agenda’ aims to provide an equitable allocation of water to
individuals and communities while encouraging sustainable water management. Second, the
‘Green Agenda’ aims to efficiently protect water in the natural environment from pollution.”)
(emphasis added.)
43 ITZCHAK E. KORNFELD, TRANSBOUNDARY WATER DISPUTES: STATE CONFLICT AND THE
ASSESSMENT OF THEIR ADJUDICATION 47 (2019).
39
40
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principles, such as equitable and reasonable utilization. 44 These
principles have also been incorporated in international case law. 45
A.

Types of Equitable Relief
1.

The Injunction

In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, a 1945 case, the United States
Supreme Court held, that in spite of the changes fashioned by Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 46 and its Erie Doctrine, “federal courts may
continue to rely on these traditional principles of equity, in order to
ascertain whether equitable relief, such as injunctions, is available
even in cases arising under state law.” 47 “
In 2006, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 48 the Supreme
Court expressed its now-familiar four-factor test for conferring
injunctive relief, which the Court asserted resulted from principles
traditionally utilized by the English Court of Chancery. 49
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas, declared that:
According to well-established principles of
equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must
satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such
relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate:
44 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997); G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th mtg., UN Doc
A/RES/ 51/229 (1997) (Entered into force on 17 August 2014. GA Res. 51/229, annex,
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/51/49)),
at Art. 5, Equitable and Reasonable Utilization and Participation. See also Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 1936 UNTS 269;
31 ILM 1312 (1992) at Art. 2(c) (To ensure that transboundary waters are used in a reasonable
and equitable way . . . .”).
45 Krishna Water Tribunal II, Report and Decision: In the Matter of Water Disputes
Regarding the Inter-State River Krishna and the River Valley Thereof, Between 1. The State
of Maharashtra; 2. The State of Karnataka; and 3. The State of Andhra Pradesh 40 (2010)(“In
equitable allocation, future uses requiring diversion of water outside the basin are relevant . .
. .”).
46 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling, Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18
(1848) (holding that where a federal court has diversity jurisdiction, and is adjudicating a state
claim, it must apply the substantive common law of the state where it is sitting or, a state law
from another state, e.g., a contract is issued in another state and that state’s law applies). In
addition, the federal judge hearing the case, must be guided by the following: state common
law, the decisions issued by the state courts, as well as state practice, and cannot establish
federal common law.; Id. at 78-79.
47 Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217 (2018),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss1/6.
48 See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
49 Id. at 391.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/11

12

Kornfeld: Equity in American and Jewish Law

2020

EQUITY IN AMERICAN AND JEWISH LAW

121

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2)
that remedies available at law are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that
the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction. The decision to grant or deny
such relief is an act of equitable discretion by the
district court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of
discretion. 50
Indeed, one commentator recently argued that the rules of
federal equity ought to be reexamined and reassessed so that becomes
a body of rules under which the courts can categorically and
authoritatively function “in the absence of contrary federal statutory
requirements when deciding whether to grant equitable relief under the
U.S. Constitution or a federal statute.” 51 For example, Congress may
resolve to include or exclude certain statutory rights and how these
should be enforced, e.g., the Clean Water Act’s 52 section 404 (s)(3),
provides for the equitable remedy of injunctive relief 53 as a statutory
entitlement.
2.

Specific performance

During the evolution of the law of contract, equitable remedies
were developed where damages were not an appropriate relief. One of
these remedies is termed specific performance. Pursuant to that
remedy, a court has the authority to compel a breaching party to
perform a specific act, in order to honor its obligation under the

50
51
52
53

Id.

Id.at 391.
Morley, supra note 47
33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2018).
Id. at § 1344(s)(3):
The Secretary is authorized to commence a civil action for appropriate
relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction for any violation
for which he is authorized to issue a compliance order under paragraph (1)
of this subsection. Any action under this paragraph may be brought in the
district court of the United States for the district in which the defendant is
located or resides or is doing business, and such court shall have
jurisdiction to restrain such violation and to require compliance.”)
(emphasis added).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2020], Art. 11

122

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

contract. 54 Recall that the purpose of contractual remedies is to place
the nonbreaching party in the same position had she not entered into
the agreement.
Thus, Article II, § 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial Code
provides that “[t]he decree for specific performance may include such
terms and conditions as to payment of the price, damages, or other
relief as the court may deem just.” 55 Indeed, courts may grant the
equitable remedy of specific performance when damages will not
provide suitable or sufficient compensation. Consequently, specific
performance is regarded as exceptional relief, which is awarded at the
court’s discretion:
[I]t must be remembered that specific
performance is not a matter of right, even when the
plaintiff’s evidence establishes a contract valid at law
and sufficient for the recovery of damages. Ordering
specific enforcement of a contract is a matter within the
sound judicial discretion of the court . . . . [T]he
plaintiff was required to show the good faith and
equities of its own position, and the trial chancellor, in
weighing the equities, was entitled to consider whether
a decree of specific performance would work an
unconscionable advantage to the plaintiff or would
result in injustice. 56
The traditional case where the remedy of specific performance
is conferred is in the sales of “unique goods,” 57 e.g., land, a unique
54

Id.

See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-716
(Buyer’s Right to Specific Performance or Replevin.). The section states,
in part,
Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in
other proper circumstances.
(2)The decree for specific performance may include such terms and
conditions as to payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court
may deem just.”).

55

Id.
Public Water Supply Dist. v. Fowlkes, 407 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. App. 1966); accord,
Green, Inc. v. Smith, 40 Ohio App. 2d 30, 39, 317 N.E.2d 227, 233 (1974). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 1981) § 357(1). (“[S]pecific
performance of a contract duty will be granted in the discretion of the court against a party
who has committed or is threatening to commit a breach of the duty.”).
57 See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 39-40 (8th Cir. 1972) (“It is
axiomatic that specific performance will not be ordered when the party claiming breach of
contract has an adequate remedy at law. . . . This is especially true when the contract involves
56
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item, which is not capable of substitution, and where replacement
damages are very difficult to calculate. For instance, in Converse v.
Fong, 58 defendant Helen Fong rescinded the sale of her home to
plaintiffs, and the latter sued for specific performance. The appellate
court observed that “[i]f otherwise equitable, specific performance
may be refused only if there is not sufficient assurance that the
defendant will receive the performance promised to her.” 59
Alternatively, in Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen, 60 the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed an order in which the lower courts granted
equitable relief by appointing a receiver to monitor the specific
performance of Pusey & Jones, as there was no equity jurisdiction.
There, Hanssen – a shareholder and creditor, of Pusey & Jones, an
insolvent company – held promissory notes issued by the company. 61
Hanssen requested the appointment of a receiver, which the trial court
approved, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld. But, in
reversing the Supreme Court held that an:
unsecured simple contract creditor has, in the
absence of a statute, no substantive right, legal or
equitable, in or to the property of his debtor. This is
true whatever the nature of the property, and although
the debtor is a corporation and insolvent. The only
substantive right of a simple contract creditor is to have
his debt paid in due course. 62
Indeed, that has been the position of a number of circuit courts
of appeal. For example, in the 1972 case of Leasco Corp. v. Taussig,
the court observed that “[i]t is axiomatic that specific performance will
not be ordered when the party claiming breach of contract has an
adequate remedy at law.

personal property as distinguished from real estate.”); U.C.C. § 2-716, (“Buyer’s Right to
Specific Performance or Replevin. (1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods
are unique or in other proper circumstances”).
58 Converse v. Fong, 159 Cal. App. 3d 86, 205 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ct. App. 1984).
59 Id. at 91.
60 Id.491
61 Id. at 495.
62 Id. at 497.
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The Affirmative Defense of Unclean Hands

The doctrine of unclean hands states that “a party seeking
equity must come to court with clean hands.” 63 The principle of
“unclean hands” is all about basic fairness with the aim of preventing
an unfair result. Therefore, the essence of an “unclean hands”
affirmative defense is the avoidance of a result where a mischievous
party is wrongly profiting in a lawsuit. Accordingly, a thief who slips
during the course of robbing a fruit store would have no claim against
the store’s proprietor for his stumble.
In another case, Manufacturers’ Finance Co. v. McKey, 64 the
doctrine of “unclean hands” was utilized as an affirmative defense.
There, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the petitioner had not itself
come into equity with clean hands. 65 Moreover, the Court noted the
following:
The insistence of appellant upon its claim for
the full rate of interest plus attorneys’ fees at a
preposterous rate, when it appeared that there was no
more business to be done under the contract because of
the receivership of the Company, savors too much of
the exaction of the pound of flesh from the creditors of
the insolvent company to be enforceable in a court of
equity. 66
Moreover, the Court held that the:
‘maxim he who seeks equity must do equity’
presupposes that equitable, as distinguished from legal,
rights, substantive or remedial, have arisen from the
subject matter in favor of each of the parties, and it
requires that such rights shall not be enforced in favor
of one who affirmatively seeks their enforcement
except upon condition that he consent to accord to the
other his correlative equitable rights. But it is well
settled, this Court said in Hedges v. Dixon County, 150
U. S. 182, 150 U. S. 189, ‘that a court of equity, in the

Duhaime’s Law Dictionary, Clean Hands Definition, DUHAME, (accessed Mar. 16, 2020)
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/CleanHands.aspx.
64 Manufacturers’ Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442 (1935).
65 Id. at 446.
66 Id. (emphasis added).
63
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absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, cannot change
the terms of a contract.’ 67
4.

Equitable Distribution of Marital Property

A number of states provide their courts with the jurisdiction to
“equitably” distribute marital property between the spouses. 68 For
example, New York Domestic Relations law provides that the trial
court must “equitably” distribute property between the spouses. 69
Indeed, the equitable distribution is mandatory. The statute directs that
“[m]arital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties,
considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective
parties 70
In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the legislature, like
New York’s, directed the courts in matrimonial actions to equitably
divide marital property. For instance, in § 3502 71 of the divorce code,
titled, Equitable Division of Marital Property the legislature declared:
General rule.--Upon the request of either party
in an action for divorce or annulment, the court shall
equitably divide, distribute or assign, in kind or
otherwise, the marital property between the parties
without regard to marital misconduct in such
percentages and in such manner as the court deems just
after considering all relevant factors. The court may
consider each marital asset or group of assets
independently and apply a different percentage to each
marital asset or group of assets. 72
Alternatively, Nevada’s legislature amended its Domestic
Relations statute in 1993 to eliminate equitable distribution, replacing
the term “equitable” with the term “equal.” 73 The legislature also
Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Deborah H. Bell, Equitable Distribution: Implementing the Marital Partnership
Theory through the Dual Classification System, 67 MISS. L.J. 115 (1997-1998); Martha L.
Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for Distribution of Property
at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 279 (1989-1990); Sally Burnett Sharp, Equitable Distribution of
Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C. L. REV. 247 (1983).
69 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (McKinney 2018).
70 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236(B)(5)(c) (McKinney 2018) (emphasis added).
71 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502(a) (West 2019).
72 Id. at § 3502(a) (emphasis added).
73
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(b)(1) (1989) (amending NRS 125.150(b)(1) (1989))
(amended by NRS 125.150(b)(1) (2017)) (requiring that the court, “to the extent practicable,
67
68
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deleted the equitable factors that previously were required to be
employed by the courts in making a ‘just and equitable’ disposition of
community property. 74 Consequently, Nevada’s Supreme Court held
that trial courts were prohibited from any further use of the term
“equitable” and could no longer consider “equitable” factors. 75
However, a court could still make an unequal disposition of marital
assets if it found a “compelling reason” to do so. 76
IV.

JEWISH LAW AND EQUITY

The lives of the Jewish peoples have been governed by laws
and rules since their reception of the Torah 77 at Mt. Sinai. Indeed, they
have been said to be “the People of the Book.” 78 For thousands of
years, “[their] culture, [their] traditions, and [their] values have been
transmitted through [their] texts.” 79 For example, the issue of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are said to have to fulfill 613
commandments (mitzvot in Hebrew). 80 That number, which is not
exact, was originally mentioned in a sermon by Rabbi Simlai in the
third century of the Common Era and is recorded in Talmud Makkot
23b. 81 The 613 mitzvot are divided into 248 positive commandments
make an equal disposition of the community property of the parties”). See also Lofgren v.
Lofgren, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (Nev. 1996).
74
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(b)(2) (1989) (amended in 1993) (requiring that the court
make a division of property “as appears just and equitable, having regard to the respective
merits of the parties”)
75
Lofgren v. Lofgren, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (Nev. 1996).
76 Id.
77 As utilized here, the Torah refers to what is commonly known in English as the Five
Books of Moses, to wit, Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy.
78
See generally Shraga Simmons, People of the Book (last visited Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.aish. com/h/sh/tat/48969071.html. (“Jews have long been known as the ‘People
of the Book.’ Here’s Why.”).
79 Sefaria, About Sefaria (last visited Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.sefaria.org/about.
80
Mendy Hecht, The 613 Commandments (Mitzvot) (2020), CHABAD.ORG,
https://www.chabad.org/
library/article_cdo/aid/756399/jewish/The-613-CommandmentsMitzvot.htm. “The Talmud tells us (Tractate Makkot 23b) that there are 613 commandments
(mitzvot) in the Torah; 248 Positive Commandments (do’s) and 365 Negative Commandments
(do not’s). However, the Talmud does not provide us with a list of these commandments.”
81
Tzvee Zahavy, The Talmud, Bava Metzia 23b, 102, HALAKHA.COM,
https://halakhah.com/pdf/nezikin/Makkoth.pdf
[THEREFORE GAVE HE THEM TORAH (TEACHINGS) AND
MANY COMMANDMENTS . . . ] R. Simlai when preaching said: Six
hundred and thirteen precepts were communicated to Moses, three
hundred and sixty-five negative precepts, corresponding to the number of
solar days [in the year], and two hundred and forty-eight positive precepts,
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(i.e.. dos) and 365 negative commandments (i.e., do nots).”82
Orthodox Jews strive to fulfill each mitzvah or commandment.
Some of these commandments include the requirement to eat
only certain kinds of mammals and fowl, 83 and from a solely kosher
ritually slaughtered animals. 84 Furthermore, the blood of the animal
must be drained, as the Torah prohibits the consumption of blood,85
e.g., “Moreover ye shall eat no manner of blood, whether it be of fowl
or of beast, in any of your dwellings.” 86 There is also an edict
regarding who may slaughter an animal. For example, the:
Ritual slaughter is known as shechitah, and the
person who performs the slaughter is called a shochet
. . . The method of slaughter is a quick, deep stroke
across the throat with a perfectly sharp blade with no
nicks or unevenness. This method is painless, causes
unconsciousness within two seconds, and is widely
recognized as the most humane method of slaughter
possible.
Another advantage of shechitah is that it ensures
rapid, complete draining of the blood, which is also
necessary to render the meat kosher.
The shochet (ritual slaughterer) is not simply a
butcher; he must be a pious man, well-trained in Jewish
law, particularly as it relates to kashrut. In smaller,
more remote communities, the rabbi and the shochet
were often the same person. 87

Id.

82
83

Id.

corresponding to the number of the members [footnote omitted] 40 of
man’s body . . . .
Hecht, supra note 80.
See, e.g., Leviticus 11:1-3:
1. And the LORD spoke unto Moses and to Aaron, saying unto them: 2.
Speak unto the children of Israel, saying: These are the living things which
you may eat among all the beasts that are on the earth. 3. Whatsoever
mammal that has a split hoof, and is wholly cloven-footed, and chews its
own cud, those beasts, you may eat.

84 In order for meat to be kosher, it must be slaughtered according to Deuteronomy 12:21,
which provides in pertinent part: “you may slaughter any of the cattle or sheep that the Lord
gives you, as I instructed you; and you may eat to your heart’s content in your settlements.”
85 Leviticus 7:26.
86 Id. (emphasis added).
87 Judaism 101, Kashrut: Jewish Dietary Laws, at Kosher Slaughtering, JEWFAQ (2011),
http://www.jewfaq.org/kashrut.htm.
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These details regarding ritual slaughter are not part of the
Torah. Rather, they were part of the oral law and were codified in the
Talmud and later, in the Shulchan Aruch (literally the Hebrew for the
“set table”), which is generally referred to in English, as the Code of
Jewish Law. 88
Finally, the Talmud at Bava Metzia 32a prohibits the causing
of pain to animals. It is referred to as cruelty to living things – Tza’ar
Ba’alei Chayim, in Hebrew.
A.

The Origins of the Talmud

In 967 B.C.E., at the age of 16, Solomon succeeded his father
David and became king of Israel. 89 The construction of the Temple of
Solomon (Beit HaMikdash - the House or Temple of Sanctification), 90
began sometime later, most likely in the tenth century B. C.E. 91 That
Temple – the first of two – was destroyed by the Babylonian King,
Nebuchadnezzar II, during his army’s siege of Jerusalem in 586
B.C.E. 92 At war with Egypt, Nebuchadnezzar was simply bound to
invade Judea, as he was concerned about any potential threat to his
armies. 93 The king exercised “a scorched-earth policy that sought to
render conquered lands uninhabitable . . . the Babylonians cared only
to depopulate peripheral regions,” 94 and thereafter to move the exiled
90F

91F

92F

93F

94F

The Shulchan Aruch was written by Rabbi Yosef Caro (1488-1575). Caro resided in the
city of Safed (Tzfat in Hebrew), located in the upper Galilee in Israel’s north. See, e.g.,
Menachem Posner, 14 Facts About the Code of Jewish Law (Shulchan Aruch), CHABAD
(2019), https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/4305141/jewish/14-Facts-About-theCode-of-Jewish-Law-Shulchan-Aruch.htm.
89 1 Kings 1:46 et seq. See also Yisrael Shalem, Jerusalem in the First Temple Period
(c.1000-586 B.C.E.), BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY, INGEBORG RENNERT CENTER FOR JERUSALEM
STUDIES, https://www.biu.ac.il/JS/rennert/history_3.html (Mar. 6, 1997).
90 See 1 Kings 6:1 “In the four hundred and eightieth year following the departure of the
children of Israel from Egypt, in the fourth year of Solomon’s reign over Israel, in the month
of Ziv, the second month, he began to build the temple of the LORD.” (translation from the
Hebrew by the author).
91 1 Kings 5-9.
92 DAVID B. GREEN, THE HISTORY OF THE JEWISH TEMPLE IN JERUSALEM 4 HAARETZ (Aug.
11, 2014), https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/.premium-history-of-the-temple-in-jerusalem1.5256337.
93 Jill Katz, The Relationship between the Jewish People and Yerushalayim: A Historical
Account of the First 400 Years 27 – 28, REPOSITORY.YU (Sivan 5773 – the given Hebrew Date
–
May
2013),
http://repository.yu.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.12202/4013/Katz_The_Relationship_betwe
en_the_Jewish_TTG%20Sivan5773.pdf?sequence=1.
94 Id. at 27-28.
88
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upper strata of each conquered land to Babylon. 95 Thus, they were able
to add new vitality to the majesty of their core region. 96 Consequently,
the Babylonians demonstrated no hesitation regarding Jerusalem or the
Temple.
The Jewish peoples’ sojourn in Babylonia lasted some fortynine years (587 – 538). 97 In 538 B.C.E., following the fall of Babylon
to the armies of the Persian emperor, Cyrus the Great, the Jewish
people were allowed to return to the land of Israel. 98 Upon their return
from Babylonian exile, the Israelites set upon rebuilding a temple,
which was rededicated in 515 B.C.E. 99 That Temple was a precursor
to the Grand Temple that King Herod built. 100 This second Temple
was an enlarged and considerably enhanced edifice that was personally
supervised by Herod himself under the watchful eyes of the Romans. 101
The Second Temple was completed in approximately 20 B.C.E.102
However, this ornate structure remained standing for less than a
century, as a consequence of the Israelites’ revolt against the Romans,
beginning in 66 C.E.103 Four years later, in 70 C.E., Titus, the Roman
general in charge of Jerusalem, pillaged the temple and razed it. 104
Following the destruction of the Second Temple
during the First Revolt and the subsequent destruction
of Jerusalem itself, accompanied by the exile of its
inhabitants, during the Second Jewish Revolt, in 132135, Judaism made a sharp turn from being a templebased cult that relied on daily sacrifices to its god. It
became a mobile faith that revolved around law and
prayer, and whose members soon spread out around the
Mediterranean basin, and later to more distant points.
The synagogue replaced the single Temple, but recalled
the sanctuary by always being physically oriented in the
Id. at 28.
Id.
97 1 Kings 5-9.
98 David Green, The History of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, HAARETZ (Aug. 14, 2014),
https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/.premium-history-of-the-temple-in-jerusalem-1.5256337;
see also Cyrus Helps the Exiles to Return, BIBLE GATEWAY (Jan. 24, 2020),
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Ezra +1-6&version=NIV.
99 1 Kings 5-9.
100 Green, supra note 98.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
95
96
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direction of Jerusalem. Prayer took the place of animal
sacrifices. 105
The Jewish people across ancient Israel were not only
distraught, bewildered but also, perplexed, at the loss of the Temple,
because that is where they celebrated the laws and rituals that governed
their lives. They were now exiled again to Babylon, among other
venues. The destruction of the Second Temple signified for the Jewish
population that their lives were futile and inconsequential without it.106
Consequently, for many of the Israelites, “the destruction of the
Temple meant the destruction of Judaism.” 107
B.

The Mishnaic Period

However, into this breach jumped Yochanan ben Zakkai, often
abbreviated as Ribaz, an eminent Jewish sage, who lived during the
period of the Second Temple, and a primary contributor to the Mishna,
the principal text of Rabbinical Judaism. 108 Following the destruction
of Jerusalem, he founded the Yeshiva 109 in Yavne. 110 Yochanan is the
father of Rabbinic Judaism and the person who “ensured the continued
survival of the Jewish faith after the destruction of the Temple . . . .”111

105

Id.
Alick Isaacs, Jerusalem 3000: Lecture 7 - The Destruction of the Second Temple, THE
JEWISH AGENCY (Aug. 23, 2005), http://archive.jewishagency.org/jerusalem/content/23693.
107 Id. at 2.
108 CATHERINE HEZSER, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE RABBINIC MOVEMENT IN ROMAN
PALESTINE 64-65 (1997).
109 The yeshiva (plural : Yeshivot or Yeshivas) was originally established by the Rabbis of
the first century of the Common Era, to train future Rabbis or, disciples of the Rav or Gaon,
the head of the yeshiva, to study (or more correctly “to learn”) Jewish religious and legal texts,
including the Mishna and Gemara. Originally, they were founded after the destruction of the
Second Temple, along the coastal plain and the Galilee in Palestine/Israel, and in Babylon,
e.g., the Yeshivot in Sura and Pumbedita. These continued in pre-World War II Europe and
in the Levant, or Orient, which included among others, the countries of North Africa, Iran,
Iraq and Yemen. Today, they are K-12 schools. With regard to American yeshivas and Jewish
religious schools where the Talmud is intensely studied, see WILLIAM B. HELMREICH, THE
WORLD OF THE YESHIVA: AN INTIMATE PORTRAIT OF ORTHODOX JEWRY (1982).
110 Ancient and modern Yavne are situated on Israel’s coastal plain, some 20 kilometers
(12.5 miles) south of city of Jaffa.
111 Isaacs, supra note 63; Jeremy Borovitz, Yochanan Ben Zakkai and the Development of
the Mishnah, SEFARIA (2019), https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/53250?lang=bi.
106
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Yochanan ben Zakkai was followed by Rabbi Yehudah
HaNasi, 112 (Nasi was a reference to the presidents of the Sanhedrin), 113
who with his students at the Yavne Yeshiva - a number of whom
became famous Rabbis in their own right, compiled the Mishnah,
during the period 200–220 of the Common Era. Initially, Rabbi
Yehudah’s teachings were unpopular and rejected by the wider
community. However, his persistence and approach to formulating
post-Temple laws safeguarded and sustained - some would say the
unrelenting - survival of the Judaism of future generations and of
today. 114
The teachings of Rabbi Yehudah, his contemporaries, and his
disciples were transmitted by a long, long line of rabbis and sages,115
down the centuries and followed the crux of what has become known
as Rabbinic Judaism, 116 which still buttresses the structure of today’s

112 With regard to the life of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, see RABBI YONASON GOLDSON,
DAWN TO DESTINY: EXPLORING JEWISH HISTORY AND ITS HIDDEN WISDOM
(2010); with an excerpt titled, Why Did Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi Decide to Codify the Mishna,
OHR SOMAYACH INTERNATIONAL (2019) https://ohr.edu/4695. For a brief discussion
of the Yeshivot in Sura and Pumbedita, see The Geonim of Sura and Pumbedita, at Gaon,
JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY (2019), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ gaon.
113 “The ancient Jewish court system was called the Sanhedrin. The Great Sanhedrin was
the supreme religious body in the Land of Israel during the time of the Holy Temple” and for
some time later. Shira Schoenberg, Ancient Jewish History: The Sanhedrin, JEWISH VIRTUAL
LIBRARY (2020), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-sanhedrin.
See also Philip
Blackman, INTRODUCTION TO TRACTATE SANHEDRIN OF THE MISHNAH (1963).
114 Isaacs, supra note 63.
115 See
generally PIRKEI AVOT, English Ethics of the Fathers chs. 1-2,
https://www.sefaria.org/Pirkei_Avot.2?lang=bi; HEZSER, supra note 108, at 64.
116 See, e.g., Michael J. Cook, Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity: From the
Pharisees to the Rabbis, 84 REVIEW & EXPOSITOR 201 (1987) (stating that the origins of
rabbinic Judaism are found in the many “Judaisms” that coexisted during the Second Temple
period in the land of Israel, when biblical and co-biblical texts were edited and interpreted.
Classical rabbinic Judaism flourished from the 1st century B.C.E. to the closure of the
Babylonian Talmud, c. 600 C.E., in Babylonia. Among the different Judaisms in antiquity,
rabbinic Judaism held that at Mount Sinai God revealed the Torah to Moses in two media, the
Written and the Oral Torah. The rabbis claimed they possessed the memorized or Oral Torah.
Classical rabbinic Judaism is separated into different strata: tannaitic (until 200 C.E.), amoraic
(200–500 C.E.), and saboraic (500 C.E.–7th century). The first stage of formative rabbinic
Judaism is represented by the Mishnah, a law code that came to closure c. 200 C.E., after the
destruction of the Second Temple of Jerusalem in 70 C.E. by the Romans and the suppression
of the Bar Kokhba uprising of 132–135 C.E. Rabbinic Judaism interpreted the Torah, often
in opposition to the priestly tradition, which was committed to the written tradition and the
sacrificial cult of the Temple. However, at the end of the formative period, rabbinic Judaism
synthesized the interpretive, messianic, and priestly traditions . . . Rabbinic Judaism continued
to flourish in the Middle Ages in the diaspora. Today it represents “normative” Judaism, the
Jewish religious expression of a substantial portion of the worldwide Jewish community.).
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various branches of the faith. 117 Alternatively, the Gemara was
compiled through debates, discussions, and deliberations by various
Rabbis in Palestine and Babylonia – who are known as the Amorim in
Hebrew 118 – during the three hundred years following the Mishna’s
compilation. The focus of the Jewish sages, both in Israel and in the
largest diaspora community of Babylonia (modern-day Iraq), was on
illuminating the opinions of the Tannaim. 119 However, to a good
extent, neither Talmud is chiefly a commentary to the Mishna. Rather,
they are an independent, or stand-alone and all-inclusive composition
of Halacha and Aggadah. 120 Aggadah is the Hebrew word, which
literally translates as “lore or narrative,” which subsumes “the portions
These include the branches of Orthodox Judaism: the non-Hassidic, Vilna or Mitnagdim
– those who oppose Hassidism – group, which subsumes modern Orthodoxy and the Mizrachi
movements, the Haradi movement, and the various sects of Hassidic Judaism. The other
groups/factions include the Conservative, Reform and Reconstructionist movements. The
main difference between the non-Hassidic movements is their interpretation of Rabbinic
Judaism. For example, in its simplest description, Orthodox Jews believe in the separation of
men and women during prayers in the Synagogue, while others hew to what is referred to as
Mehadrin – from the Hebrew to praise or exalt, but used to define an orthodox person who is
painstakingly scrupulous in the observance of religious rites and rituals, and who believes in
a strict or enhanced observance – where men and women will not only not sit next to each
other in public prayer, but at all times. Thus, on Mehadrin buses, there is complete and
absolute segregation of men and women. As for Hassidic Jews, they fit into the Orthodox
division, but hew to their leader’s, or Rebbe’s, teachings.
118 See, e.g., ISIDORE SINGER & CYRUS ADLER, THE JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA: A DESCRIPTIVE
RECORD OF THE HISTORY, RELIGION, LITERATURE, AND CUSTOMS OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE FROM
THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 527-8 (1916); Ancient Jewish History: Amoraim,
JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY (2019), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/amoraim.
119 Nissan Hindel, The Mishnaic Age—The Tannaim: 3488–3950 (273 BCE–190 CE),
CHABAD
(2019),
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/115257/jewish/TheMishnaic-Age.htm.; See also LOUIS JACOBS, A CONCISE COMPANION TO THE JEWISH RELIGION
(1999).
120 See generally Study Jewish Thought, Sages & Scholars, Halakhah and Aggadah, MY
JEWISH LEARNING (2019), https://www.myjewishlearning.com/category/study/jewishthought/sages-scholars (stating that according to Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, Judaism has
a traditional division of Jewish textual material into halakhah (legal materials) and aggadah
(legendary materials) and restates the division as Jewish behaviors (halakhah) and the
reasons/motivations for those behaviors (aggadah) . . . Halakhah represents the strength to
shape one’s life according to a fixed pattern; it is a form-giving force. Aggadah is the
expression of man’s ceaseless striving that often defies all limitations. Halakhah is the
rationalization and schematization of living; it defines, specifies, sets measure and limit,
placing life into an exact system. Aggadah deals with man’s ineffable relations to God, to
other men, and to the world. Halakhah deals with details, with each commandment separately;
aggadah with the whole of life, with the totality of religious life. Halakhah deals with the law;
aggadah with the meaning of the law. Halakhah deals with subjects that can be expressed
literally; aggadah introduces us to a realm that lies beyond the range of expression. Halakhah
teaches us how to perform common acts; aggadah tells us how to participate in the eternal
drama. Halakhah gives us knowledge; aggadah gives us aspiration.
117
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of the Talmud and Midrash which contain homiletic expositions of the
Bible, parables, stories, maxims, etc., in contradistinction to
Halachah” 121 (also spelled Halakhah) which “refers to Jewish law. Per
its literal translation, ‘the way,’ halachah guides the day-to-day life of
a Jew.” 122
C.

History of the Talmud

Talmudic history begins following the destruction of Jerusalem
and the second Temple by Titus in the year 70 of the Common Era.
During the post Temple period, there were two hubs of Jewish life –
Palestine and Babylonia – the latter had the majority of Jews, who
escaped following the Temple’s obliteration. These two locales are
where Rabbinic Judaism formed, i.e., the post-Temple Judaism; the
one that has been practiced for over 1,850 years and continues today. 123
These two settings were also where two versions of the Talmud were
composed.
They are, the predominant Babylonian Talmud, known in
Hebrew, as the Talmud Bavli, which includes the Mishnah and the
Gemara authored and compiled by the Jewish sages of Babylonian, as well as other commentaries - and the lesser utilized Jerusalem
Talmud or the Talmud Yerushalmi, 124 as it is referred to in Hebrew
and composed in the Galilee. In comparing the Bavli, or Babylonian
Talmud to its counterpart, Yerushalmi Talmud, some “scholars have
frequently pointed out that the discussions in the Bavli are more longwinded and discursive, involving extensive explanation and abstract
conceptualization, forced interpretations of early sources, and so
on.” 125
The laws transmitted orally from Sinai were
organized by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi into six orders
containing 63 tractates, called “[masechtot”] in
Aggadah,
CHABAD
(2019),
https://www.chabad.org/search/keyword_cdo/kid/10816/oq/Aggadah/jewish/Aggadah.htm.
122 Menachem Posner, What Is Halakhah (Halachah)? Jewish Law, CHABAD, (2019),
(https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/4165687/jewish/What-Is-HalakhahHalachah-Jewish-Law.htm.
123 HERMAN L. STRACK, INTRODUCTION TO THE TALMUD AND MIDRASH (Markus
Bocksmuehl ed., trans., 2d ed. 1996).
124 Also referred to as the Talmud di Venei Ma’arava, The Talmud of the Group of the
West. See Jerusalem Talmud, THE JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY (2019),
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/talmud-jerusalem.
125 Id.
121
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Hebrew. The Hebrew acronym for the entire Six
Orders is called “the Shas”, the acronym for “Shisha
Sedarim”—the Hebrew for the Six Orders. 126
As in the previous common law section, I will discuss Hebraic
equitable principles by example.
1.

Mishna Bava Metzia

My focus here will begin with the Talmudic tractate, or treatise,
of Bava Metzia in the Babylonian Talmud. It is the second tractate of
three, dealing with harms or damage to property, and is under the
Hebrew heading Nezikin. 127 The Bava in Bava Metzia is the Aramaic
for “Gate.” Thus, Gate of Finding Chattel, or Gate of Lost Objects.
The three tractates include Bava Kama – damages: Bava Metzia –
property rights and Bava Batra – real estate and other transactions. The
three are the volumes in the fourth of the six Sedarim (orders), referred
to as Nezikin. I will concentrate on civil harms or damages, i.e., torts.
128
We open with the tractate Bava Metzia page 2a, and the following
Mishnah 129:
The six tractates are:
1. Zera’im (Seeds), dealing with prayer and blessings, tithes and
agricultural laws (11 tractates);
2. Moed (Festival), relating to the laws of the Sabbath and the Festivals
(12 tractates);
3. Nashim (Women) concerning marriage and divorce, some forms of
oaths and the laws of the nazirite (7 tractates);
4. Nezikin (Damages); dealing with civil and criminal law, the
functioning of the courts and oaths (10 tractates);
5. Ke’doshim (Holy things), regarding sacrificial rites, the Temple, and
the dietary laws (11 tractates) and finally;
6. Tehorot (Purities), pertaining to the laws of purity and impurity,
including the impurity of the dead, the laws of food purity and bodily
purity (12 tractates).
127 In Hebrew, the root word for Nezikin is “nezek,” which translates to harm or damage.
128 See generally Rabbi Jack Abramowitz, The 63 Tractates of Shas, ORTHODOX UNION
(2019), https://www.ou.org/torah/mitzvot/taryag/the_63_tractates_of_shas_-_part_i. (“The
laws transmitted orally from Sinai were organized by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi into six orders
containing 63 tractates, called “[masechtot]” in Hebrew.”) The “Shas” is the Hebrew acronym
for “Shisha Sedarim”— Hebrew for the Six Orders. Id. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, known in
English as Judah the Prince, lived from 135 CE-219 CE. See Yehuda HaNasi (Judah the
JEWISH
VIRTUAL
LIBRARY
(2019),
Prince),
THE
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/yehudah-hanasi-judah-the-prince.
129 The Mishnah’s origin is disputed. The minority view is that the oral law was redacted
in 189 C.E. See HEINRICH GRAETZ, 6 HISTORY OF THE JEWS 105 (1898). The alternative or
prevailing view is one expressed in the Encyclopaedia Judaica, which posits that the oral law
126
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Case 1: Tractate of Bava Metzia 2a 130

Mishna: Two [persons appear before a court]
and are holding a tallit [i.e., a garment]. One of them
[John] states “I found it” and the other [Jane] says “I
found it”. One of them [John] says “it is entirely mine”
and the other [Jane], says “it is entirely mine”; then
shall the one swear that his share of the garment is not
less than half, and the other shall swear that [her] share
in it is not less than half; and [the value of the garment]
shall then be divided between them.
If one says ‘it is all mine’, and the other says,
“half of it is mine”, he who says, “it is all mine” shall
swear that his share in it is not less than three quarters,
and he who says, “half of it is mine” shall swear that
his share in it is not less than a quarter. The former
then receives three quarters [of the value of the
garment/chattel] and the latter receives one quarter.
The Mishna is interpreted and discussed by numerous
commentators. Among them were various Rabbis and Tannaists
(Tannaim in Hebrew) 131 who wrote and compiled the Mishna. One
of the most prolific commentators, centuries after the Tannaim, was
Rabbi Solomon ben Isaac (Shlomo Yitzhaki), known as “Rashi” (based
was redacted at the beginning of the third century C.E. See 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, at
319 (Fred Skolnik, ed., 2nd ed. 2007), https://ketab3.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/
encyclopaedia-judaica-v-14-mel-nas.pdf. The Mishnah also preserved the teachings of earlier
rabbis and reveals the marks of an amalgamated editing.
130 Rav Moshe Taragin, Shenyaim Ochazin Be-Talit: Splitting a Disputed Talit, VBM The
Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash, https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shenayim-ochazin-betallit-splitting-disputed-tallit (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) (“This ruling makes the first mishna
in Bava Metzia a bit surprising. The mishna describes the well-known scenario in which two
people are jointly clutching a disputed article of clothing, and the mishna rules that the two
parties split the clothing . . . ).
The above three paragraphs are from Tzvee Zahavy, Talmud Baba Metzia,
HALAKHA.COM, https://halakhah.com/pdf/nezikin/Baba_Metzia.pdf. I have separated the text
into two separate paragraphs, each with its own case. Zahavy’s original text contains three
cases in one paragraph. His version also capitalizes the entire Mishna. The third section of
the Mishna and the section that was left out has to do with riding an animal that was found.
Its logic is the same as the two paragraphs above and therefore will not be addressed here.
131 The Tannaim were teachers of the Oral Law, who lived from approximately, 70 C.E. to
250 C.E. and are said to be direct transmitters of an oral tradition passed from teacher to
student, until they and Judah HaNasi codified these laws in the Mishnah, among other
compilations. See S. Safrai, The Era of the Mishna and Talmud (70 - 640), in A HISTORY OF
THE JEWISH PEOPLE (Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson, ed., George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. Eng.
Trans., 1976).
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upon an acronym of his Hebrew initials), who lived in France during
the tenth century of the Common Era. 132 In his elucidation of this
Mishna, Rashi observes that the claimant to half the garment concedes
that half belongs to the other claimant so that the dispute revolves
solely around the second half. 133 Consequently, each of them receives
half of this disputed half - or a quarter each. Recall, that originally
each claimed ownership of the entire garment. This is the Rabbis’ use
of equity.
In its commentary on the foregoing, the Gemara 134 asks: Why
must the Mishnah declare that [John] says “I found it”, and so does
[Jane]; [John] says, “it is mine”, and so does [Jane]? Does it not suffice
for each to make one claim? In a response the Tosafists 135 answer as
132 Rashi, is one of the most significant Jewish commentators of the entirety of the Torah,
Prophets and Ketuvim (the Jewish Scriptures comprise three books of five books of Moses,
the prophets, and the collected writings, e.g., Psalms, Proverbs, Job and the Song of Songs)
and the Talmud, in the history of Judaism. Rashi was born in 1040, in the northcentral French
city of Troyes and passed away in the year 1105 C.E. Unlike Rashi’s commentary, the Tosafot
(additional commentaries), were Rashi’s students and medieval commentators of the Talmud.
Their writings took the formulation of analytical and illuminating annotations, which are
printed, in most Talmud editions, alongside Rashi’s outer margin commentaries, are more
comprehensive, often serving as an amplification of the Talmudic dialogue itself, and sought
to explain the text in a sequential manner. In many instances, we find the Tosafot quoting
parallel texts so as to reconcile apparent contradictions. In the Talmud the location of Rashi’s
and the Tosafists’ commentary changes depending on the page. On one page, Rashi’s
commentary appears on the right side of the Mishna and the Tosafists’ commentary is on the
left. It reverses on the next page and returns to the original order on the next. The foregoing
is based on the author’s long-standing knowledge. For a more formal explanation of Rashi’s
life, see AVIGDOR BONCHEK, RASHI: THE MAGIC AND THE MYSTERY 1-2(2015); AVRAHAM
GROSSMAN, RASHI (Joel Linsider trans., the Littman Library of Jewish Civilization) (2012);
Hila Ratzabi, Sages & Scholars, Who Was Rashi, MY JEWISH LEARNING 1-4 (2019),
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-was-rashi., (last visited Jan. 21, 2020). See
also VBM The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash, Dr. Avigail Rock, Lecture #4: Rashi
(Part I), https://www.etzion.org.il/en/lecture-4-rashi-part-i (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). (“It is
impossible to exaggerate Rashi’s importance in shaping the worldview of the Jewish People;
it may be said that after Tanakh and Talmud, Rashi’s commentaries are next in line in terms
of their influence. One expression of this phenomenon is the fact that the first Hebrew book
ever printed (Rome, 1469) was the Torah with Rashi’s commentary.”).
133 Sefaria,
Rashi
on
Bava
Metzia
2a,
at
2:a2,
https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Bava_Metzia.2a.1?lang=bi (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
(“He admits that the half belongs to his friend and we only judge him on his half (which he is
claiming). Therefore, (when) this one says ‘all of it is mine’ he swears etc. like the first verdict
[i.e: the first case in the Mishnah] what they judged on him (meaning) they both swear that
each one has at least half of it and each one takes his half.”)
134 See Zahavy, supra note 132, at 1.
135 The Tosafists, as noted in note 134, are additional commentators. They were chiefly
Rashi’s students and successors, who lived during the 200 years following Rashi’s death, i.e.,
from approximately 1100-1368. See generally Nissan Mindel, The Tosafists, CHABAD.ORG,
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follows: indeed, each holder of the garment makes only one claim.
Each states, “I found it, and it is mine.” Accordingly, the plea “it is all
mine” is added, in order to clarify that seeing alone does not constitute
or make a claim. However, why would one think that it could be
assumed that one who has only seen the garment could plead “I found
it”? 136
The Gemara acknowledges that the Torah’s use of the term
‘found’ infers having taken hold of. 137 However, the Tanna 138 utilize
“popular language,” in which, upon seeing an item on the road, a
potential claimant could use the term “found it,” given the prevalent
belief that one acquires a lost object by sight alone. It was, therefore,
essential to add the plea “it is all mine,” and therefore, to highlight that
merely seeing an ownerless item cannot constitute a claim for
possession.
Indeed, there is a reason why the Mishna stresses the plea “it is
all mine.” Had it not specified that plea, one could have rightly
declared that elsewhere in the Talmud the word “found” is used to
denote “seen,” and therefore one would have drawn the conclusion that
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/112332/jewish/The-Tosafists.htm.
(last
visited Jan. 21, 2020).
136 On Rashi’s commentary on Bava Metzia 2a, see generally ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE
TALMUD: THE STEINSALTZ EDITION, VOL. I: TRACTATE BAVA METZIA, PART I at 9 (1989); THE
SCHOTTENSTEIN EDITION OF THE TALMUD BAVLI, VOL. I: TRACTATE BAVA METZIA, (2a), Ch.
1-3 (Rabbi Hersh Goldwurm, ed. 1992).
137 See
generally,
Sefaria,
Mishnah
Bava
Metzia
1,
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Bava_Metzia.1?
ven=The_Mishna_with_Obadiah_Bartenura_by_Rabbi_Shraga_Silverstein&lang=bi.
By law, they should divide without an oath; but the sages ordained that
neither of them takes anything without an oath, so that a man should not
go and take hold of his neighbor’s garment and say: “It is mine!” And it
was necessary for the tanna to apprise us both of “I found it” — (an
instance of) finding a lost object, and: “It is all mine” — (an instance of)
buying and selling. For if only the first were taught, I would say that it is
only in that case that the Torah imposed an oath, one being apt to
rationalize to take a lost object unlawfully, viz.: “My friend will lose
nothing. I will go and seize it and divide it with him.”
138 Rabbi Louis Jacobs, Who Were the Tannaim and Amoraim?: The Great Sages of the
JEWISH
LEARNING
1
(2019)
Mishnah
and
Talmud,
MY
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/ tannaim-amp-amoraim.
The Talmudic rabbis whose views are recorded in the Talmudic literature
are called Tannaim . . . [The term is] . . . also found in the Talmud in
connection with learning activity. In this context, a Tanna (‘rehearser’ or
‘teacher’) was a functionary who rehearsed opinions and statements of the
teachers of the first two centuries . . . [of the Common Era].
Id.
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mere sight establishes an entitlement to possession. 139 Accordingly,
the Mishnah first states “I found it” and then “it is all mine” so that we
might conclude from the additional phrase that merely seeing an object
does not indicate a claim for possession.
The Gemara asks a succeeding query: Should it not suffice for
us to accept as evidence, the statement “I found it”? 140 We would then
know that he/she claims, “it is mine”! The response is: had the Mishna
only imparted “I found it,” one could have assumed that he/she meant
“I saw it”; and therefore he/she acquired the garment solely by seeing
it. Therefore, the Mishna demonstrates that “it is mine,, in order to
explain that a garment, or any similar chattel’s holder, does not acquire
possession solely through seeing it alone. 141
In this Bava Metzia Mishna, we are presented with two cases
that address the finding of a garment – or indeed, any chattel – by two
people, who each claim to have found it and to have total ownership
over it. The Mishna’s description of the facts and the court’s
equitable division of the garment resolve the dispute, i.e., Each
receives the share that they swore they owned. Note, however, that
“equitable” does not mean “equal.” Nevertheless, hidden in the text
are a number of issues that the Mishna – and a judge – has to tackle
and a range of fundamental rules which she must confront. First, how
is “possession” defined? How is it established? And, under what
conditions will possession lead to ownership?
Second, by
administering oaths to the claimants – assuming that they are not
lying – the judge is ruling out that one or both of the claimants is a
thief who stole the garment. Third, we are provided with an exegesis
of the logic that the Rabbis employed in resolving issues related to
lost objects.
Masechet/Tractate. Baba
Metzia 2b
In chapter two of Bava Metzia, 142 the Gemara states that:

139 Talmud
- Mas. Baba Metzia 2a, at 1 (2019), HALAKAH.COM,
https://halakhah.com/pdf/nezikin/ Baba_Metzia.pdf.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 4.
142 Mishna Bava Metzia 2, Sefaria (Dr. Joshua Kulp ed.), https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_
Bava_Metzia.2?lang=bi.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/11

30

Kornfeld: Equity in American and Jewish Law

2020

EQUITY IN AMERICAN AND JEWISH LAW

139

if the Tanna had dealt solely with the case of
finding I [an unknown commentator][ 143] might have
said that only in such a case would the Rabbis impose
an oath, because each disputant might permit himself
[to claim the garment] by saying to himself, ‘My
neighbour loses nothing through my action [as it cost
him nothing to acquire the garment]; I shall go and take
hold of it and share it with him.’ 144
A footnote to the above states that “[t]he oath would then act
as a deterrent, [because] even if he did not hesitate to put forward a
wrong claim he would not be ready to commit perjury.” 145 Of course,
the sages who argued their various positions and drafted the Mishna
and the Gemara were assuming that the claimant feared G-d and would
not lie. Other tractates in the Talmud address false testimony. 146 That
subject is beyond the scope of this article.
b.

Case 2: Marriage

The Torah offers little direction with regard to the practices of
marriage. For example, what is the method for a man of finding a
spouse, the dowry, the type of marriage ceremony, and the like. These
were likely part of the oral Torah, since the Talmud fully addresses and
explains the character of the marital relationship.
For instance, the Mishnah’s tractate of Kiddushin ch.1:1,
specifies that a wife is acquired in three ways: (1) through money; (2)
via a contract; or via sexual intercourse. Generally, all three of these
conditions are satisfied, even though only one is required to achieve a
valid marriage. In Judaism, the marriage is a contractual relationship

Zahavy, supra note 132, Baba Metzia 2a, at the bottom of page 1, text accompanying
footnote 6, refers to “Kadi, replied.” Footnote 6 provides: “This word may also mean ‘an
unknown authority’”.
144 Id. at 2.
145 Bava Metzia 2b at note 1. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD: TRACTATE BABA MEZI’A, BABA
MEZI’A 2A, Chapter I (2019), http://www.come-and-hear.com/babamezia/babamezia_2.html.
146 Jewish law provides techniques to urge a witness not to lie. For example, the Ten
Commandments, provides: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor.” Exodus
20:16. The peril, or caution that is provided prior to a person’s testimony, for example,
determining the witness’s competence to testify, or that the witness has not tampered with or
manipulated the evidence, as well as voir dire by the judge. Indeed, caution of the legal
penalties that will be exacted that a witness receives, for instance, in financial suits is touched
upon in Mishnah Sanhedrin 3.6, and considered at length in Sanhedrin 29a.
143
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between the prospective bride and the prospective husband. The
contract is called a Ketubah 147 – which in Hebrew is a writing.
The equity issue turns on the view that the ketubah is a contract
wherein both parties are said to participate equally, thereby
endeavoring to dismiss the appearance of the wife as the husband’s
property. However, a number of critics have challenged this view,
arguing that marriage is a kinyan mamon—a monetary contract, which
defines marriage, as a relationship whereby the woman becomes an
acquired object. 148
The next example of the use of equity deals with an estate of a
deceased husband. The mishna dealing with the marriage contract,
Ketuboth, provides the following:
Mishna: Ketuboth 93a
If a man who was married to three wives died, and the
kethubah[the marriage contract] of one was a maneh [valued at
a one hundred zuz dowry], of the other two hundred zuz, and
of the third three hundred zuz, and the estate was worth only
one maneh [one hundred zuz], they divide it equally.
If the estate was worth two hundred zuz, the claimant
with the kethubah of the maneh receives fifty zuz, while the
two other claimants of the two hundred and the three hundred
zuz each receive three gold denarii (worth seventy-five zuz).
If the estate was worth three hundred zuz, the claimant
of the maneh receives fifty zuz, the claimant of the two hundred
zuz receives a maneh (one hundred zuz) and the claimant of the
three hundred zuz receives six gold denarii (worth one hundred
and fifty zuz)…. Similarly, if three persons contributed to a

147 Elon Gilad, The Ketubah, or Jewish Wedding Contract: Traditionally written in
Aramaic, the ketubah details the groom’s obligations toward his future wife, HA’ARETZ Aug.
23, 2015, https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/ the-ketubah-or-jewish-wedding-contract1.5390222 (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). (“Under Jewish law, the traditional wedding ceremony
process starts with the signing of the ketubah (Hebrew for ‘written thing’), which is the
marriage contract . . . The ketubah is traditionally written in Talmudic-era Aramaic. More
modern versions can be written in Hebrew, English or other languages. As the groom is
unlikely to be fluent in Aramaic, the rabbi will read the ketubah aloud and explain what it
stipulates.”).
148 See generally MOSHE MEISELMAN, JEWISH WOMEN IN JEWISH LAW 96-97 (1978).
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joint fund and they had made a loss or a profit they share in the
same manner. 149
Distribution of the Estate
Estate
Wife #1
Wife #2
value
100
33 1/3 zuzim 33
1/3
zuzim
200
50 zuzim
3
Gold
Dinarii
300
50 zuzim
100 zuzim

Wife # 3
33 1/3 zuzim
3 Gold Dinarii
6 Gold Dinarii

What should be evident, is that the authors of the Mishna and
Gemara were aware that each woman will, or may have to, fend for
herself, if for example she has no parents. Consequently, they divided
the estate equitably, based on the original contract between the two
parties.
D.

Circling Back to Basics

One must also remember that the Mishna and Gemara always
“circle back” to the Torah or halakha, 150 i.e., Jewish Law, since the
Torah is what is being interpreted in the oral law. That is, these texts
are not studied in a vacuum. Indeed, they illuminate, expand and build
upon Torahic laws. As regard found objects, these are referred to in
Leviticus 5:21-24, which declare, in pertinent part:
149 The ketubah, or the marriage contract, is a requisite part of every Jewish marriage. It
sets forth the husband’s obligation, pursuant to Jewish law, to his future wife during the
marriage, and his monetary duties upon death or divorce. Indeed, two witnesses are required
to verify, in writing, that the groom executed the ketubah. In most run of the mill, standard
form ketubot (plural for ketubah), the groom declares that as a husband he agrees to obligate
himself to provide his wife, in the amount of 200 zuz and 200 zekukim of silver upon the
occurrence of either death or divorce. The groom places a wedding band on his betrothed
finger, and declares the following from the ketubah, “After all, you are sanctified unto me [to
be my wife], with this ring, pursuant to the laws of Moses and Israel. And, I shall work,
respect, provide for you, and sustain you in harmony with the customs and traditions of Jewish
husbands who have worked, respected, provided for, and sustained their wives with
faithfulness. And I will furnish you with 200 zuzim as dowry. Where the woman was
previously married – divorced or widowed – or she is a convert to Judaism, the amounts of the
dowry and additional support are halved, i.e., 100 zuzim. However, the bride is also given a
supplementary amount, for clothing, food, and other needs, “according to the way of the
world.” Note, that beyond dowry, the husband will generally leave his estate to his wife.
150 See Walzer, supra note 1, for the definition.
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Leviticus 5:21, “The Lord spoke unto Moses saying, if
any one sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord,
and deal falsely with his neighbour in a matter of . . .
robbery . . .; 22. or have found that which was lost, and
deal falsely therein, and swear to a lie; in any of these
that a man does, sinning therein; 23. Then it shall be, if
he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore that
which he took by robbery . . . or the lost thing which he
found, 24. Or anything about which he has sworn falsely,
he shall even restore it in full, and shall add the fifth
part more thereto; unto him to whom it appertaineth
[appertains or belongs] shall he give it, in the day of his
being guilty. [i.e., on the day when he makes voluntary
acknowledgment of his guilt . . . .] 151
The foregoing is quite different from a common law equity
claim. Common law equity is employed where there is no statute or
rule to guide the court. However, even though one reads and analyzes
the cases in the Mishna, as many students of the Talmud do –
particularly when they begin its study – even without referring to the
Torah, they are aware that its rules are always in the background. That
is, because the Mishna, the Gemara, the Shulchan Aruch, and the many
other commentaries on Jewish law, fill in the missing elements for a
rule. The following examples may work to clarify the point.
Part of the Torah’s Ten Commandments, located at Exodus
20:1-17, contains the commandment, which declares “You shall not
murder” (alteration added). Reading that commandment, one ought to
be cognizant of numerous questions, including: (1) what constitutes
murder; (2) how does one prove murder? (3) is murder a crime? (4) is
it a tort? (5) how many judges are required to adjudicate a murder case?
(6) how many witnesses are required (eyewitnesses or other witnesses
who are competent to testify)? (7) are the witnesses testifying
truthfully, or are they lying, or coerced, or are they colluding for their
own gain? (8) is the act punishable at all? and (9) if so, what
punishment, if any, should be meted out to the murderer? These issues
and numerous others are the province of the Talmud, and they are
settled in the Mishna and Gemara in order to make a reasoned equitable
finding. The authors of the Talmud fill in these lacunae, utilizing
151 DR. J. H. HERTZ, C.H., THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAS 422-23(Soncino Press 2d ed.
1980) (emphasis added).
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equitable remedies. The use of equitable processes and how remedies
are reached is addressed below.
For example, the Torah at Numbers 35:16-20 provides
illustrations of acts constituting murder. In the Mishna, Makkot
(Lashes), which is part of Nezikin (Damages), the Rabbis address the
issue of murder. However, they also address what is not murder. In
this, they are directed by the Torah, specifically, given Numbers 35:1013. 152 That section discusses sanctuary/refuge cities. Here, the Rabbis
parse out what constitutes involuntary manslaughter. The discussion
in the Mishna shifts to accidental killing, and will be the focus here, to
demonstrate the Rabbis’ equitable thinking. Recall that in Biblical
times six cities of refuge existed. 153
If a person accidentally killed another, the killer was given the
opportunity to escape to the cities of refuge where he was protected
from the revenge of the victim’s family, until the court could judge and
release him from the death sentence. Again, utilizing the Torah, as one
must, the sages move on to determine whether a particular defendant
on trial for murder should be put to death. Note, how the discussion
begins with text from the Torah, regarding murder, and as the sages
proceed to parse out remedies, they arrive at an equitable remedy,
based on the various factual scenarios.
c.

Case 3: Murder v. Negligent
Homicide
Mishna Maakot Ch. 1-2, 7b:17

The main objective of the following is to point out how
utilizing the logic of equity, the authors of the Mishna arrive at the
equivalent of the crime of involuntary manslaughter. 154
152

Id.

Numbers 35:10-13:
10Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, When you cross the
Jordan to the land of Canaan,11 you shall designate cities for yourselves;
they shall be cities of refuge for you, and a murderer who killed a person
unintentionally shall flee there.12 These cities shall serve you as a refuge
from an avenger, so that the murderer shall not die until he stands in
judgment before the congregation [and repent].emphasis added.

The cities were the Galilean city of Kedesh, Schechem (Nablus), Hebron, Bezer, Ramot
and Golan. See Exodus 21:13 and Joshua 20:7-8.
154 MAKKOS 2a-24b The Soncino Babylonian Talmud 23 (Reformatted by Reuven
Brauner,
5772
in
the
Hebrew
calendar,
2018
in
the
Gregorian),
153
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MISHNA: These are the people who go into
banishment, [i.e., are exiled to be given the chance to
seek sanctuary in a city of refuge]. Anyone who kills
in error, [internal note 13: i.e., accidentally, without
premeditation.] Whether one is liable to be banished
depends on the particular circumstances of the case: If
one was rolling a roller to smooth the covering of
mortar that he applied to [ seal his roof] [internal note
14: Eastern roofs are flat; they are plastered to make
them water-tight and give them the necessary slope.
The leveling is done by a log (or smooth flat stone) to
which a long handle attached, by which it is pushed
backwards and forwards.] and it [the roller] [slipped
over] fell down and killed somebody, or if one was
lowering a barrel from the roof and it fell on a person
and killed him, or if he was descending a ladder and he
fell on a person and killed him, in all these cases he is
banished. But if one was pulling a roller toward him
and it fell from and it fell from his hands upon a person
and killed him, or if one was lifting a barrel and the rope
was severed and it fell upon a person and killed him, or
if one was climbing a ladder and he fell upon a person
and killed him, that unintentional murderer is not
banished. This is the principle: Any murderer who kills
unintentionally through his downward motion is exiled,
and one who kills not through his downward motion is
not exiled. 155
Examining the case with the rope and barrel, we note that the
first example states: “lowering a barrel from the roof” is not punishable
by banishment. The reasoning must be that this is the expected mode,
or custom, of moving the barrel from the roof to a lower elevation.
Certainly, once a job of constructing or repairing a roof is done, the
barrel must be removed. Thus, the negligence in that scenario suggests
that the barrel’s handler was acting in the mode that others, who are
similarly situated, would lower a barrel. However, in the second
example: “lifting the barrel with one rope, may be inherently riskier,
https://halakhah.com/rst/nezikin/38%20-%20Makkos.pdf. The capitalized words are from the
Mishna. Note, the difference between Makkot and Makkos is one of pronunciation. In
modern/Israeli Hebrew the word is Makkot.
155 Id. at Ch. 2 (emphasis added).
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and may not have been the custom, or that one rope may not have been
sufficient to raise the barrel. Consequently, the lowering a barrel from
the roof becomes an issue.”
As will become clear from Gemara’s analysis, the key here is
what we refer to today as negligence. If the killer is negligent then he
has the right to escape to a city of refuge. If the murderer is not
negligent, then he does not. It turns on custom or intent, as can be
gained from the following:
GEMARA. R.[abbi] Abbahu asked R. Johanan:
If while a person is going up a ladder, a rung giving way
under him comes down and kills somebody, how would
this be taken? Was the death to be considered [a result]
of an upward or a downward movement? [internal note
(14)] The man moves upward, the rung moves
downward; which is the determining factor here as
regards the law of banishment, the man’s movement or
that of the rung?] — He replied: You have indeed laid
your finger on [an accident resulting from] a downward
motion as a prerequisite of an upward movement. To
this R. Abbahu objected [from the Mishnah]: This is the
general principle: Whenever the death was caused in
the course of a downward movement, he goes into
banishment, but if [caused] not in the course of a
downward movement, he does not go into banishment.
Now, [what kind of case would be included in the
general] terms of the latter principle — but if [caused]
not in the course of a downward movement . . . if not
an instance of this kind? — [R. Johanan replied:]
Following your opinion, what instance would you
include in the general terms of the first principle —
whenever. . . in the course of a downward movement
. . . [You could give] but one, namely, that of a butcher;
and that instance is also within the terms of the latter
principle, as it is taught: If a butcher whilst chopping
meat killed somebody [there are four different versions
of the case]. Version A [internal note (15) ) Lit., ‘One
Tanna teaches ‘ . . . and another Tanna teaches.] has it:
If he killed a person in front of him, he is liable to go
into banishment; if behind, he is exempt. Version B: If
behind him, he is to go into banishment; if in front, he
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is exempt. Version C: Whether in front of him or
behind, he is to go into banishment. Version D:
Whether in front of him or behind, he is exempt. And
[continued R. Johanan], it is really not difficult [to
explain these diversities], thus: In Version A: If he
killed in front by a downward stroke [he goes into
banishment]; if behind him by an upward swing [of the
chopper], he is exempt. [internal note (16) Although the
upward swing behind is the beginning of the downward
stroke in front.] In Version B: If he killed in front of
him by the upward swing [he is exempt]; if behind him,
by the downward [back] movement [he goes into
banishment]. [internal note (17) Although the
downward back movement is but a continuation of the
upward swing in front.] In Version C: If he killed either
in front or behind him by the downward movement [he
goes into banishment]; and in Version D.’ If he killed
either in front or behind him by the upward swing [he
is exempt]. 156
The foregoing is somewhat complicated, if for no other reason,
because attempting to translate Hebrew – sometimes archaic – and
Aramaic is difficult at times. Nevertheless, when dealing with the
cities of refuge for inadvertent murderers, one of the key issues is: what
constitutes an unintentional, or unintended killing? Under the law, the
members of the family of the person who was killed are allowed to
exact revenge, including killing the killer, with impunity, if the killer
does not escape to a city of refuge. However, once the killer finds her
way into a city of refuge, the victim’s family cannot touch the killer,
as she is provided refuge. Accordingly, it is critical to determine the
proper punishment: banishment to a city of refuge versus death. Thus,
in order for the Talmud to be fair, impartial, or even handed, i.e.,
equitable, the Rabbis must construe what kind of act is excusable and
worthy of a right to seek refuge.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Equitable principles are not an inflexible or rigid set of rules –
which is the law’s province – rather, they are general principles from
156

MAKKOS 2a-24b, supra note 149, at 23.
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which deviation may occur in specific cases. Indeed, pursuant to the
common law “[e]quity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy.”
That is why the common law fashioned the doctrine ubi jus ibi
remedium, or “where there is a wrong, there must be a remedy.” In the
Talmudic tradition, as seen above, the sages who compiled both the
Mishna and the Gemara, also do not have hard and fast rules, whether
dealing with lost objects, intestate estates, or killing of a human being.
Each scenario is governed by the facts of the case. In these two modes,
the American and the Jewish principles are quite similar, even given
the thousands of years between their separate development. However,
the Mishnaic or Talmudic tradition represents a methodology
employed by the Sages’ interpretations, which are grounded in the
Sages’ exegesis of the Torah. 157
Indeed, for decades secular Jewish and non-Jewish lay people
and scholars, who may not be familiar with Jewish law, “have had the
misconception that Jewish law is overly formal, that it gives slavish
obedience to the letter of the law, and that it is oblivious to practical
consequences hermeneutics [sic] of the oral Torah and an
interpretation as well as the running commentary of the text of the
Torah.” 158
However, in distinction to the formalism of the
examination and study of Jewish law, its scholars, particularly
Professor Aaron Kirschenbaum, 159 “demonstrate[] that the resolution
of an actual dispute is an equitable activity. It is not an abstract
exercise in reasoning but a practical resolution of a problem. The goal
is to reconcile the parties.” 160
The goal, therefore, is not to simply expose the truth at any
price, but to settle the dispute in a way that mends the wounds between
the litigants and within the wider community. 161 In closing, the
unquestionable difference between Jewish and American courts that
employ equity is best described in the following:
See, e.g., MICHAEL WILLIAMS ET AL (EDS.), INNOVATION IN RELIGIONS TRADITIONS 12829 (1992).
158 Steven F. Friedell, Aaron Kirschenbaum on Equity in Jewish Law, 1993 BYU L. REV.
909, 909 (1993), https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1993/iss3/6.
159 Rabbi Professor Aaron Kirschenbaum, an eminent law professor at the University of Tel
Aviv’s Buchmann Faculty of Law, was “one of the greatest Jewish law scholars of the modern
era.” Radzyner School of Law, Conference Held in Memory of Prof. Aaron Kirschenbaum
HERZLIYA
[Israel]
(Mar.
6,
2017),
z”l,
IDC
https://www.idc.ac.il/en/whatsup/pages/kirschenbaum-memorial.aspx.
160 Friedell, supra note 158, at 912.
161 Id.
157
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Jewish courts can proceed under the method of
strict law or by the method of compromise if authorized
by the parties. Compromise means that the court will
impose a solution that differs from the requirements of
strict law and will respond to the “equities” and special
features of the particular case. [Footnote omitted].
Unlike the American system of trial, which considers
the adversary system to be the best method for
uncovering the truth, the Jewish system is more dubious
about the ability of witnesses and fact finders to
determine what actually happened. In addition, the
Jewish system recognizes that the dispute over what
happened may play only a small part in the complex
relationship between the parties. 162

162

Id. at 912-13.
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